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VALIDITY OF PARKING METER ORDINANCES IN KENTUCKY.
In 1942, the Kentucky Court of Appeals in City of Louisville v.
Louisville Automobile Club' held that a city ordinance providing for
the installation and operation of parking meters was a valid exercise
of police power. The Court, in arriving at its decision, recognized and
followed the clear majority of opinion in cases of this nature as
shown by decisions in other states. The cases holding contrary were
cited but the Court stated that it was not inclined to follow the
reasoning and conclusions of those cases.
The public has a right of free and unobstructed passage in a
street, but this right is subject to reasonable regulation.' Parking,
however, is. a privilege and may be prohibited altogether The right
to stop when occasion demands, as a temporary stopping for loading
and unloading, is generally looked upon as an incident of the right
of travel and is not considered as parking!
Although control over streets and highways rests in the state, it
is well recognized that not only by express statutory authority, but
by statutes which allow the exercise of reasonable police power,
cities may regulate the use of their streets by motor vehicles, which
includes regulation over parking vehicles on the street.'
The Auto Club did not seriously challenge the general authority
of the city to regulate parking but based their unsuccessful attack on
the following objections: (1) the ordinance constituted a revenue
measure and could not properly be classified as an exercise of
police power; (2) it authorized a nuisance and an unreasonable ob-
struction interfering with the use of sidewalks and streets and vio-
lated the constitutional rights of an abutting property owner; (3) it
was an unauthorized abandonment of the deed of dedication of said
land for use as a public street; and (4) it worked a discrimination
against abutting property owners in the regulated zone and car
owners parking in the regulated zone in favor of property owners
and those who park outside the zone.
'290 Ky 241, 160 S.W 2d 663 (1942).
'Henkel v City of Detroit, 49 Mich. 249, 13 N.W 611 (1882)
see Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v City of Quincy, 136 Ill. App. 563, 27
N.E. 192, 194 (1891) 3 DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPPOPRATIONS (5th ed.
1911) sec. 1163.
'Pugh v. City of Des Moines, 176 Iowa 593, 156 N.W 892 (1916),
see Ex parte Duncan, 179 Okla. 355, 65 P 2d 1015, 1017 (1937), Vil-
lage of Wonewoc v. Taubert, 203 Wis. 73, 233 N.W 755, 756 (1930).
'American Co. of Arkansas v. Baker, 187 Ark. 492, 60 S.W 2d
572 (1933) Lowell v Pendleton Auto Co., 123 Ore. 383, 261 Pac. 415
(1927).
'Whyte v. City of Sacramento, 65 Cal. App. 534, 224 Pac. 1008
(1924), Johnson Oil Refining Co. v Galesburg Railway, Lighting
and Power Co., 200 Ill. App. 392 (1916) City of Ashland v. Ashland
Supply Co., 225 Ky. 123, 7 S.W 2d 833 (1928).
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The first two of these objections will be briefly discussed, as
they have been the principal ones made m litigation on this subject
and have been upheld in the few cases holding such an ordinance
invalid.'
With reference to the first objection, a municipality cannot,
under the guise of a police regulation, impose a revenue tax where it
has no authority to impose a revenue tax.' Cooley, in The Law of
Taxation, states that the distinction between a demand of money
made under the police power and one made under the power to tax
is not so much one of form as of substance and if the purpose is evi-
dent there is no difficulty in classifying the case and referring it to
the proper power.' He further states that if the primary purpose of
the legislative body in imposing the charge is to regulate, the charge
is not a tax even if it produces revenue for the public.9
Kentucky has long applied the doctrine that under the ex-
ercise of the police power it is competent for the sovereignty to de-
mand and collect fees and charges which in the aggregate will pay
the expenses of administering the regulatory law plus an additional
amount sufficient to pay costs which are attributable to and pro-
duced by the activities of the thing regulated 0 In view of this doc-
trine, it would seem exceedingly difficult in a parking meter case
to show an amount so excessive as to constitute the ordinance a
revenue measure instead of a police regulation f the full amount of
the fees collected were spent on traffic regulation expenses." Al-
'City of Birmingham v Hood-McPherson Realty Co., 233 Ala.
352, 172 So. 114 (1937) (deprived abutting property owner of prop-
erty in violation of due process clause) Brodkey v. Sioux City, 229
Iowa 1291, 291 N.W 171 (1940) (revenue measure), M. H. Rhodes
Inc. v City of Raleigh, 217 N.C. 627, 9 S.E. 2d 389 (1940) (revenue
measure)
'Borough of Kittanning v. America Natural Gas Co., 239 Pa.
210, 86 Atl. 717 (1913), see Viquesney v Kansas City, 305 Mo. 488,
266 S.W 700, 702 (1924) State ex rel City of Bozeman v Police
Court of City of Bozeman, 68 Mont. 435, 219 Pac. 810, 811 (1923).
1 COOLEY, THE LAW Or TAxATION (4th ed. 1924) sec. 27.
Ibzd; see State ex rel City of Bozeman v. Police Court of City
of Bozeman, 68 Mont. 435, 219 Pac. 810, 812 (1923) cited supra note
7- Littlefield v. State, 42 Neb. 223, 60 N.W 724, 725 (1894).
"
0 City of Newport v French Bros. Bauer Co., 169 Ky. 174, 183
S.W 532 (1916) (proceeds of a vehicle license tax used to repair
city streets) McGlone, Sheriff v Womack, 129 Ky. 274, 111 S.W 688
(1908) (dog license fund created for purpose of remunerating the
owners of sheep killed by dogs) see Blue Coach Lines v. Lewis, 220
Ky 116, 121, 294 S.W 1080, 1082 (1927)
' See Clarck v. City of New Castle, 32 D & C 371, 30 Mun. 65
(Pa. 1939) (held, fact that proceeds totaled $12,000 in 9 months
was not sufficient to constitute a revenue measure where the
original cost of the parking meter system was $25,000), Atkins V.
State Highway Dept., Tex. Civ App. 1918, 201 S.W 226 (1918)
(vehicle license act produced a sum 12 times amount necessary for
administration of the law-held, fact that excess is to be used in con-
structing roads does not render it a tax).
STUDENT NOTES AND COMMENTS
though some states have invalidated such ordinances on the ground
that they were revenue measures, as a general rule the courts have
refused to do so.'" The Kentucky Court, in the principal case, stated
that if it should develop that the proceeds from the fees collected
were "so excessive as to actually constitute 'revenue' as the word
is applied, the court would have the power to require a reduction
so as to remove the objectionable feature. '
In overruling the second objection the courts have stated that
to class a parking meter as a nuisance or unreasonable obstruction
would be to condemn fire hydrants, mail boxes, waste boxes, and
public utility poles' Whether the fee to a city street is in the ad-
jacent landowner or in the city, there is no material difference in
principle with regard to the extent of the rights of the public. The
abutter does have a right of regress and egress to and from his
property arising from the contiguity of his property to the street,
but the public interest is superior to this property interest, and due
process of law is not violated where this right is reasonably regu-
lated.1 7 As stated above, temporary stopping for loading and unload-
ing is generally considered an incident of the right of travel, and
though a person will not be denied this right, even it may be regu-
lated."8 The parking meter ordinance does not deny one an oppor-
tunity to load and unload passengers or merchandise near his prop-
erty any more than permitting free parking by the public would do;
it merely denies him the right to leave his vehicle parked on a
public street without paying a fee. In view of the fact that a person,
as an abutting owner, has a right of access to his property and as a
member of the public has the right to stop for temporary loading
and unloading, it seems that a well drawn ordinance should provide
"Hendicks v. City of Minneapolis, 207 Minn. 151, 290 N.W 428
(1940), Ex parte Duncan, 179 Okla. 355, 65 P 2d 1015 (1937) cited
supra note 3.
"1290 Ky. 241, 245, 160 S.W 2d 663, 665 (1942) (It would be
interesting to see how the court would go about effecting such a
reduction without declaring the entire ordinance invalid.)
"Id. at 246, 160 S.W 2d at 665; In re Opinion of the Justices,
297 Mass. 559, 8 N.E. 2d 179 (1937)
' See Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 340, 24 L. ed. 224, 229
(1876).
"6 See Hughes v. New York El. R. Co., 130 N.Y. 14, 28 N.E. 765,
767 (1891).
"
7 Andrews v City of Marion, 221 Ind. 422, 47 N.E. 2d 968
(1943), Gilsey Buildings Inc. v. Incorporated Village of Great Neck
Plaza, 170 Misc. 945, 11 N.Y. Supp. 2d 694 (1939) City of Columbus
v. Ward, 65 Ohio App. 522, 31 N.E. 2d 142 (1940).
See Village of Wonewoc v. Taubert, 203 Wis. 73, 233 N.W 755,
757 (1930) cited supra note 3.
L. J. 7
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for loading zones in each block of a congested area for the purpose of
allowing business to be conducted without undue hardship."
Shortly after the decision in the principal case, the Kentucky
Legislature passed an act authorizing cities of the second class to
provide for the installation and operation of parking meters. As no
such express power was given cities other than those of the second
class, there was some doubt as to the power of lesser cities to install
and operate parking meters, -' though all of these lesser cities have
statutory power to enact police regulations, 2 and in addition the
cities of the third and fourth class have express power to regulate
vehicles' and to exercise exclusive control over public ways.'
Despite this doubt, many of these smaller cities proceeded to
adopt parking meter ordinances, which in addition to aiding m the
regulation of traffic have been of inestimable aid to the small town
treasuries. ' These ordinances have usually brought a storm of pro-
test from the merchants in the area affected, who in some cases
have obtained injunctions against the city from the circuit court,
but it appears that these injunctions have generally been dissolved
on a hearing.
Doubt as to the power of these smaller cities to enact such ordi-
nances seems dispelled by two recent cases. The Kentucky Court in
1945, in Miller v City of Georgetown,. stated that the above act con-
ferring authority upon cities of the second class to instalf and
operate parking meters, and another act conferring authority upon
such cities to provide for off street parking facilities, did not show
an intent of the legislature to withhold such authority from cities
of other classes. It should be noted, however, that the direct holding
of this case applied only to the acquisition of off street parking
facilities. But in Graves County v City of Mayfield; decided 2n
"See Gilsey Buildings Inc. v Incorporated Village of Great
Neck Plaza, 170 Misc. 945, 11 N.Y. Supp. 2d 694, 702 (1939) cited
supra note 17" City of Columbus v Ward, 65 Ohio App. 522, 31 N.E.
2d 142. 143 (1940) cited supra note 17.
'KY. R. S. (1946) sec. 94.740.
" For application of the rule of express mention and implied ex-
clusion in construing statutes, see Goebel v Goebel, 201 Ky 819,
823, 258 S.W 691, 693 (1924) Boswell's Ex'x v Senn's Adm'r, 187
Ky 473, 478, 219 S.W 803, 805 (1920).
-KY. R. S. (1946) sec. 85.120 (6) (third class) sec. 86.110 (11)
(fourth class) sec. 87.070 (fifth class) sec. 88.080 (sixth class)
'KY. R. S. (1946) sec. 85.150 (1) (third class) sec. 86.120 (1)
(fourth class)
KY. R. S. (1946) sec. 94.360.
See THE LEXINGTON LEADER, July 17, 1947, p. 13, col. 3 (receipts
from parking meters in Winchester, Ky., a city of the third class,
averaging $100 a day) THE LEXINGTON LEADER, Aug. 22, 1947, p. 8,
col. 1 (receipts from parking meters in Mount Sterling, Ky., a city
of the fourth class, averaging about $60 a day)
"301 Ky 241, 191 S.W 2d 403 (1945).
305 Ky 374, 204 S.W 2d 369 (1947).
STUDENT NoTs AND CO1TNMENTS
June, 1947, the Court apparently held that Mayfield, a city of the
fourth class, had the right to install parking meters on a public
way.'
What about fifth and sixth class cities? It is significant that in
the principal case the Court rested its decision, not on the special
circumstance that Louisville was a city of a particular class but on
the general police powers of the municipality. In view of this and'
the decision in the Georgetown case, it would follow that a city of
any class which can exercise general police power would have the
power to install and operate parking meters, subject to the test of
reasonableness which is always applied to an exercise of police
power. Fifth and sixth class cities have such police power?
In conclusion, it may be stated that parking is not a right but a
privilege. Kentucky cities of all classes have been given power by
the state to provide for reasonable police regulations. A Kentucky
city of any class may therefore enact a parking meter ordinance
provided such enactment is not an abuse of such power. The ordi-
nance will not be declared invalid as an unauthorized revenue
measure merely because it takes in an amount in excess of the ex-
penses needed to administer the ordinance. An additional amount
may be collected to provide for other traffic regulation expenses, if
the fees collected should be so 'excessive as to constitute "revenue"
as the word is applied by the court, it has been stated that a reduc-
tion would be made to remove the objectionable feature. A person
owning abutting property does have the right of ingress and egress
to and from his property and as a member of the public has the
right to stop for temporary loading and'unloading, but an ordinance
requiring him to pay a fee to park his car on a public street does not
deny him either of these rights and is not a violation of the due
process clause.
FRANK K. WARNOCK.
On Feb. 27, 1948, after this note was approved for publication,
this question was conclusively settled by Stephens v. City of Russell,
306 Ky. 727, 209 S.W 2d 81 (1948)
'Ky. R. S. (1946) sec. 87.070 (fifth class) sec. 88.080 (sixth
class) cited supra note 22.
